An audacious raid on Tobruk in North Africa to lay waste , from land and sea, the vital German Afrika Corps supply port, codenamed "Operation Agreement", took place Sept.13/14th 1942 involving elements of the RM, RN, RAF, SAS, SBS, LRDG and a six man Special Forces group of the SIG.

Taking part in Agreement were Capt David Stirling's SAS again; Lt Col Vladimir Peniakoff of the Libyan Arab Force (Popskis Private Army - PPA) - born in Belgium of Russian Jewish parents; and Colonel John E. "Jock" Haselden (KIA on the raid) Egyptian born son of English and Greek parents who had guided into shore the abortive Special No 11 Commando raid to attempt to kill Rommel in Nov 1941 at Beda Littoria (29), operation "Flipper" - where Col. Geoffrey Keyes won a posthumous VC. Haselden was an Arabic linguist (who spoke several Bedouin dialects) and wealthy cotton mill owner as well as a member of MI (Military Intelligence) Research, who had been back and forth behind enemy lines since the war began. With Haselden there had been members of the Palestinian Jewish 51st Commando on that raid, notably Cpl. Drori who spoke both Arabic and German (30).

On this Tobruk raid, Haselden was Officer Commanding the Commando group Force B (codenamed Picture (31) , the land based assault striking from the desert via Kufra Oasis, codenamed Daffodil (32). LRDG Patrol Y1 (led by Captain David Lloyd Owen) were only acting as guides from Kufra to the perimeter of Tobruk, with 83 Commandos and an SIG team with 8 three ton Canadian Chevrolet trucks (In WO 201/749, the SIG were described cryptically as "Special Detatchment G(R)" in the Battle Plan). Afterwards, Y1 were to take part in another part of the raid. It was the Commandos and SIG who were actually to penetrate Tobruk itself by bluffing their way through the perimeter fence with the SIG posing as German guards, as they had done at Derna/Martuba, and assault the coastal guns of Mersa Umm es Sciausc east of the harbour with the rest of Force B. The detachment of SIG were "to play a special part in the proceedings" (33) with Buck and Lt T C David Russell, Scots Guards, who was also fluent in German. Two other British Officers allegedly attached to SIG were Capt H Bray (4th Indian Division) and Lt D Lanark ,Scots Guards. However,in 1989 it emerged that Gordon Landsborough in his 1956 edition of "Tobruk Commando", had - due to War Office restrictions - used nommes de guerre for many of the Commandos. The true names were revealed in David List's 1989 introduction to the book. So Bray was in fact Buck, and Lanark was Russell. It also emerged that the Nazi traitor Brueckner was really called Brockmann.

Dressed in German uniform and speaking German the SIG even carried faked love letters to ficticious wives in Germany and authentic German weapons, pay books (Sold Buch), insignia, cigarettes and chocolates. The letters were written by an SIG man, using forged German stamps and frankings, and copied by ATS (women) for authenticity, in Cairo. The women then dressed as civilians and posed with the SIG in their German uniforms, and then a Berlin background was dubbed on. One Jewish SIG member, Weizmann, actually called his "girlfriend" Lizbeth Kunz, as this was the name of an actual well known Nazi who lived in his street in Berlin before the war; this meant that if it came to it, he could claim (under interrogation if required) she was a real person. The SIG men were constantly tested on this detail in their documents - names, addresses, jobs; even German Army typewriters and stationery had been procured from British Intelligence for such use - but as Landsborough says (34) "the Palestinians never faltered, never protested".

The SIG were to play the role of German guards transporting three truck loads of British POW's to a camp at Tobruk. As Smith says "this was high bluff and indeed required nerves of steel and much courage", which the SIG showed they had in plenty. Needless to say the Germans would have shot them out of hand as spies had their disguises been penetrated (see Appendix 2). In fact following the earlier betrayal, the Germans already knew of the SIG's existence. Buck suspected this and that is why he only took 4 or 5 of the SIG with him, as opposed to the dozen or so that may have been required. (Buck also planned to kidnap a particular German general as booty, who was supposed to be staying in the old YMCA in Tobruk) (35). We must remember, however, the deep motivation of these men who had fled Nazi Germany as Jewish refugees, whose families had been or were being murdered in the Holocaust, and who were absolutely committed to the downfall of Nazism.

(A poor and not very accurate Hollywood movie ("Tobruk"), directed by Arthur Hiller and starring Rock Hudson, Nigel Green and George Peppard, made in 1966, portrayed the SIG role in this raid but tended to mix elements of their work on other raids too. It was filmed in Yuma, Arizona).

The small SIG team reached Kufra in RAF Bombay Transports where they met the LRDG and other Commandos. There the SIG continued drilling in German uniform and using German commands as their British comrades looked on in amazement (36). They were Cpl Weizmann, and Privates Wilenski, Hillman, Berg and Steiner (37). A Naval Signal of Sept 12th 1942 (38) - from C-in-C Mediterranean to D.C.O.M.E. stated that "Buck and 6 OR's operating with Haselden may be wearing German uniform. Their recognition signal is 'red handkerchief'".

They kept themselves to themselves because, despite the fact that it was known that the traitor had been a Nazi, the SIG were looked upon with suspicion, following the betrayal of the French group the previous June. One LRDG veteran, Jock Fraser, told the author of "Massacre at Tobruk", that "We all distrusted these guys though some were very brave men". (Again the SIG names were not real; David List names them - Steiner was in fact really 10716 Pte. Hillman (SAS Reg.), Berg was Rohr, Weizmann was Opprower and Wilenski was H Goldstein. There was also a Pte Rosenzweig but Tiffen does not remember his English alias.

(Weizmann/Opprower's father had been murdered by the Nazis and at 16 years old he had been sent by his family to Palestine. He volunteerd for the British army on the outbreak of war in 1939, but when he was given only administrative work, he hitch-hiked to Egypt and volunteered for active service. Three times he was charged for breaking camp to get into the front line. Eventually the SIG recruited him (39).

On D Minus 7 (Sept 6th) the main part of Force B left Cairo for Tobruk, which was 300 miles behind the lines but a distance of 1800 miles by their roundabout route. Morris says the raiders left Kufra on Sept. 5th, however, to travel the 800 miles to Tobruk - which seems much more likely and is in any case borne out by Lloyd-Owen's report (40), which says they left at 1706 hrs precisely on that day.

Gordon Landsborough (41) describes how they travelled south to El Kharga (500 miles inland), then west to Kufra (to meet the SIG) and then north to Hatiet Etla. Here, 90 miles from the target, they rested on the night of Sept. 10th (Kennedy-Shaw - see below - however, does not even mention the SIG as taking part in the raid, possibly for security reasons when writing his book! I am grateful to Captain, now General, David Lloyd Owen, for pointing this out to me - letter 13.12.99). The plan was for them - at 2am on the 14th - to call in Force C from seaward , if they had managed to silence the guns of Mersa Umm es Sciausc. (A Jewish British officer and LRDG survey/cartography expert, Capt. Ken Lazarus, was with SAS Sqdn 2 with Stirling, the same night when they launched a diversionary attack at Benghazi - an SIG man was on this raid too - see below (42) .

The Commando convoy of lorries did not attract attention from the German and Italian patrols because so many allied vehicles had been captured by the Axis forces. On the trucks were the Afrika Corps motif painted using captured German stencils by Steiner/Hillman, and identification marks on the cab roofs to ward off prowling stukas. Also across the bonnet was a wide white stripe, sign of "Bentezeichen" or booty, which the Germans painted on captured allied vehicles, and the divisional sign ER 372, which Intelligence had discovered was a real division stationed near Alamein. The vehicles carried 30 fake POW's each instead of the usual 40, because of the need to hide the arms and uniforms they contained. The SIG carried the requisite fake passes and ID documents. Landsborough, however, says that only 4 trucks were used with one SIG driver in each and Buck in the front one dressed as a German officer. Then, about 4 miles out, just three trucks went in with the fourth disabled by removing the distributor cap (which was buried near the front left wheel), for use in escape later should it be needed. At the drop off point there was then an emotional parting with the LRDG as they cheered each other goodbye for they all knew that many of the Commandos would be going to their death. It is interesting that Lloyd-Owen notes in his post-raid report that Haselden had NOT arranged a rendezvous with him in case of a land withdrawal (43), which proved to be a costly mistake.

On approaching the perimeter road across scrub land they saw two German trucks coming towards them on the same course; but they simply sped by without pausing. Then a red German light spotter plane approached and circled twice just a few hundred feet above them, but it too passed on (44).

On reaching the main metalled road to Tobruk they merged easily into the regular base traffic flow to the perimeter fence. They were merely waved through by Italian guards even though Buck leaned out to show his documents. The SIG men, playing their parts fully, responded as Germans did, insulting their Italian allies as "schweinhunds" as they drove passed.

Inside they met a fast moving convoy coming in the opposite direction and the middle truck was struck a glancing blow by a German staff car carrying, according to Weizmann, a high ranking officer. Nobody stopped but the German convoy halted and angry voices were heard; eventually, after a tense moment, the Germans sped away. Further on they were accompanied for a while by two heavily armed motor cycle combinations and a solo, of German military police who were irritatingly inquisitive. The Commandos took the safety clips off their guns but there was no attempt to stop them and the motorcycles turned off (45). They then came upon a rock face looming in the darkness,about 9pm, and Haselden nodded casually towards it saying "that's the bomb-proof oil storage depot we must destroy later tonight".

All around were tented enemy camps and lines of German and Italian troops going about their duties as the three trucks sped on. But then a further hitch; Buck's Chevrolet halted and he and the SIG driver got out and walked out of sight. Clearly there was a problem - a fence had been built across the turn-off they were meant to take. Soon Buck and his driver returned - they had found a new track further on; the convoy continued.

After 15 minutes, they were met with a harsh challenge in German; one of the Commando officers got out and walked into the darkness. Soon he returned with a German rifle, having silenced the enemy sentry. Another 500 meters and they stopped, de-bussed and put on full combat kit. Nearby were the few buildings they had expected - the administrative centre for the coastal defences they were to silence.

At 10.30pm the RAF softening-up bombing raid began.

On reaching their first objective, a small villa to be used as their HQ, Haselden and the 4 or 5 SIG, with Buck and Russell, burst in and drove off or killed the Italian platoon holding it. One was captured but was later killed "trying to escape". Knocking out various German machine gun posts, a wireless station and negotiating mine fields, Force B began taking casualties but at 2am signalled Force C to land using the unfortunate codeword "Nigger" (the alternative "Cloud" was never used (46). However, under heavy fire and in darkness, only 2 of 16 MTB's were able to land a handful of reinforcements.

Buck, Russell, Wilenski and Weizmann cleared several more positions alone whilst the Commandos dealt with several others. The SIG team then moved, as planned, a little inland to guard against any counter attack from that direction and captured and held four ack-ack gun emplacements. Through the night they held these positions against sustained attacks by the Italians to recapture the guns. Eventually they rolled grenades into the barrels and destroyed them. But, as the enemy, now fully alerted and prepared, re-grouped, as the sun came up, they closed in on B Force, now outnumbered and short of ammunition after a fierce fire-fight. Weizmann and Wilenski were met by Berg who told them that Buck had ordered them to destroy all their German documents and uniforms, find British uniforms and destroy the lorries. Haselden, from his HQ in the captured villa, had ordered destruction of all the coastal guns and then every man for himself.

It was clear that the Tobruk raid had failed, reinforcements would not be coming from the seaward invasion as planned, and they had to move fast to save themselves. Berg moved off and Wilenski and Weizmann destroyed one lorry with petrol and then moved to a cave, stripped off, burnt everything that would incriminate them, and then went naked,to find two uniforms which they had eventually to take from two dead Commandos.

Buck suddenly re- appeared with Russell; they had apparently been on some other SIG mission, perhaps to try and release the Allied POW's in Tobruk (part of the original plan had Agreement succeeded) or capture that general in the old YMCA? There was also talk of breaking into the enemy garrison's strongroom and stealing the German funds! To this day it is not known precisely what the SIG had in mind.

Haselden ordered all the force remaining to re-embark on the last two trucks and try to break out (others made vainly for the sea but were then driven inland and in small groups tried to head east back to Allied lines). Russell brought a truck up as Steiner appeared still in German uniform. Buck yelled to him to take it off even though he himself was still dressed as an Afrika Korps officer!

As they made to get away, the ever calm and brave Haselden in the lead truck meanwhile decided to halt and cover the escape of those behind him. He led a forlorn charge singlehandedly against the encroaching Italian forces with Russell, Buck, Watler and Berg and Steiner following him. Berg was wounded and Haselden was killed by a grenade. Steiner called his CO's name but there was no answer. In the melee and still half-light, Steiner grabbed Berg and dragged him away (47). Others, though, were forced to surrender because they had no food, water or ammunition and were carrying wounded comrades.

Only 6 of Haselden's group escaped, and then made a run for it to Allied lines, including Lt Russell and (according to Landsborough) Buck, Berg and Wilenski. Weizmann was with them but had been wounded later breaking into an Italian camp for food. After 17 days he was unable to go on and agreed to be left behind. Local Arabs handed him over to the Italians, who handed him to the Gestapo. He was tortured for 5 days but revealed nothing. At one point they made him dig his grave and stood him in front of a firing squad. However, an Afrika Korps Officer eventually had him released to a POW camp (48). After many close calls and terrible hardships, the rest of the group reached Allied lines on November 18th. (Despite every effort by Lloyd-Owen, Naval Signals testify that he lost all contact with Force B early on in the raid and was unable to search for or rescue any survivors the next day (49).

In another escape party led by Lt Tommy B Langton of the SBS (ex-Irish Guards) were Watler and 19 year old Pte. Steiner/Hillman; he had already lost his left boot in the fighting and also had a foot lascerated by barbed wire . Knowing he would be shot if caught he changed his name to Kennedy and was known as Ken by his comrades throughout his evasion adventure. It was known that the Germans knew his identity. He was in fact a short, broad Austrian Jew, son of a Viennese butcher. At age 16 he had been imprisoned for anti-Nazi activity and then escaped to Palestine where he joined the Pioneer Corps thinking they were a fighting unit. He served with them in France in 1940 and then joined the tough 51st Middle East Commandos and fought in Eritrea (50). At some time he had served in the French Foeign Legion. After several weeks dodging German and Italian patrols and being fed by friendly Arab villages - where Hillman in fact saved the group's lives several times by negotiating as interpreter in his excellent Arabic for food; and got himself a new pair of boots - Hillman and his party eventually reached Allied lines at Himeimat 400 miles west of Tobruk on Nov 13th, having been marching for 78 days, much of it in bare feet! (50a) Hillman ended up at No 1 South African Convalescent Depot (51).

The failure of this raid marked the end of the SIG as a fighting force and surviving members were transferred to the AMPC (Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps). From here several joined No. 2 Commando and fought with them till war's end in the Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic. According to David List, Steiner/Hillman later joined the SAS as did Tiefenbrunner and others; Wilenski/Goldstein - who had fought on the Mersa Matrul and Fuka raids with L detatchment LRDG - was captured after Operation Agreement but then later fought in the Far East SAS against the Japanese. Tragically Russell was murdered in Yugoslavia working for SOE in August 1943 and Buck was killed with the SAS in 1946 (51i).

Smith's account of the Tobruk raid is inconsistent with Landsborough's, who actually spoke with eye witness survivors. Smith used many PRO records but these, at that time are alleged to have been partial and contradictory. Ultimately, the readers must decide for themselves. What, however, is not in doubt is that the SIG were extremely brave men who willingly threw themselves into the devil's cauldron, and were often left to fight their own way out. They should all be remembered with pride as Lions of Judah.